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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
On various dates between March and July 2020, the 
Governor and Secretary of Health of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania (“Defendants”) entered orders to address the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Plaintiffs, comprised of Pennsylvania 
citizens, elected officials, and businesses, challenge three pairs 
of directives:  stay-at-home orders, business closure orders, 
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and orders setting congregation limits in secular settings.1  The 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania concluded that the orders violated the United 
States Constitution, County of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 
883, 891 (W.D. Pa. 2020), and Defendants appealed. 
 
While the appeal was pending, circumstances changed.  
On the health front, society has learned more about how 
COVID-19 spreads and the efficacy of masks, therapeutics 
have been developed, and vaccines have been manufactured 
and distributed.  In fact, more than 60% of Pennsylvanians 
have received a COVID vaccine.  
 
There also have been changes on the legal front.  An 
amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution and a concurrent 
resolution of the Commonwealth’s General Assembly now 
restricts the Governor’s authority to enter the same orders.  Pa. 
Const. art. IV § 20(d); H.R. 106, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Pa. 2021) (concurrent resolution terminating the 
Governor’s March 6, 2020, proclamation of disaster 
emergency, as amended and renewed).  In addition, the 




 The issue before us is whether those events moot this 
case.  We hold that they do.  “[A]n appeal is moot in the 
 
1 Each pair of directives consisted of substantially 
identical orders, one issued by the Governor and the other 
issued by the Secretary of Health.  
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
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constitutional sense only if events have taken place during the 
pendency of the appeal that make it impossible for the court to 
grant any effectual relief whatsoever.”  In re World Imports 
Ltd., 820 F.3d 576, 582 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).  The 
parties agree that the Governor’s orders are no longer in effect 
and that he has been stripped of his power to unilaterally act in 
connection with this pandemic.    As a result, the “law no longer 
provides [him] a mechanism” to “repeat the alleged harm.”  
Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Moreover, the Secretary’s orders have expired and there is 
consequently no relief that this Court can grant concerning 
them.  Thus, the case is moot.   
 
 No exception to mootness applies.  As Plaintiffs have 
conceded, the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply here 
because the orders expired by their own terms and not as a 
response to the litigation.  See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 
(2017) (Mem.) (stating that because the orders suspending the 
entry of aliens and refugees “expired by their own terms[,] the 
appeal no longer presents a live case or controversy” (alteration 
and quotation marks omitted)); Spell v. Edwards, 962 F.3d 
175, 178-79 (5th Cir. 2020) (observing that an expired order is 
“off the books” and so “there is nothing injuring the plaintiff 
and, consequently, nothing for the court to do”).  It is 
conceivable that the expiration of the executive orders could be 
opportunistically timed to avoid an unfavorable adjudication, 
but we have no basis to conclude that has happened here.  On 
the contrary, the Secretary maintained her orders for several 
months after Plaintiffs challenged their constitutionality, and 
 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, whether or not 
this case is moot.  See Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 963 
F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2020).   
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the orders expired after more than half of all adults in 
Pennsylvania were vaccinated.  We generally presume that 
government officials act in good faith, and we will not depart 
from that practice under these circumstances.  See Marcavage 
v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 861-62 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 
The “capable of repetition yet evading review” 
exception to mootness also does not apply.  That exception is 
“narrow” and “applies only in exceptional 
situations,” Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 
2017), where “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too 
short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and 
(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining 
party will be subject to the same action again,” Id.  There must 
be more than a theoretical possibility of the action occurring 
against the complaining party again; it must be a reasonable 
expectation or a demonstrated probability.  Murphy v. Hunt, 
455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982).  
 
  A plaintiff bears the burden to show that the “capable of 
repetition yet evading review” exception applies, see Belitskus 
v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 648 (3d Cir. 2003) (placing the 
burden on the party seeking to have their claim excepted from 
mootness based on the “capable of repetition yet evading 
review” exception); N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power 
& Light, 772 F.2d 25, 33 (3d Cir. 1985) (“It is the burden of 
the moving party to establish that the issue is ‘capable of 
repetition yet evading review.’”).   Plaintiffs have not carried 
that burden.  Plaintiffs have pointed only to the fact that the 
Secretary of Health still claims the power to issue orders of the 
sort before us now.  That observation, however, does not 
satisfy both elements of the test.  The executive orders before 
us were the subject of a full evidentiary record developed and 
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considered on an expedited basis.  Hence, they were not of too 
short a life to be reviewed.3  Nor can we say that there is a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining parties will 
be subject to the same orders again.  Defendants have 
represented that the public health landscape has so 
fundamentally changed that “what we were facing in this case 
is not what you would be facing going forward,” Oral 
Argument at 5:30-6:06, 11:47-11:59, and, though public health 
authorities continue to provide new guidance, Plaintiffs here 
have given us little reason to disbelieve that representation.  
 
Thus, no exception to mootness applies, and we will 
dismiss the appeal.  
 
 
3 Whether, as a general matter, orders functionally 
evade review when they are of sufficiently short duration that 
they cannot be addressed through the appellate process is not 
something we need to consider here, since Plaintiffs’ argument 
fails on the second prong of the “capable of repetition yet 
evading review” test, as described herein.  Cf. Brach v. 
Newsom, -- F.4th --, 2021 WL 3124310, at *9 (9th Cir. July 
23, 2021) (“Were California again to enforce a distance-
learning mandate on Plaintiffs’ schools, by the time a future 
case challenging the new mandate could receive complete 
judicial review, which includes Supreme Court review, the 
State would likely have again changed its restrictions before 
that process could be completed.  Effective relief likely could 
not be provided in the event of any recurrence, which makes 
this a paradigmatic case for applying the doctrine of “capable 





When a case becomes moot while an appeal is pending, 
appellate courts generally follow the “established practice” of 
vacating a district court’s judgment with directions to dismiss.  
See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950); 
Khodara Env’t, Inc. ex rel. Eagle Env’t L.P. v. Beckman, 237 
F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 2001).  Guided by considerations of 
judicial fairness, the Supreme Court in Munsingwear observed 
that a judgment that is “unreviewable because of mootness” 
should not “spawn[] any legal consequences” for the party who 
sought reversal on appeal.  340 U.S. at 41.  A directive to 
vacate a judgment under Munsingwear is an exercise of 
discretion that should occur “only after a consideration of the 
equities and the underlying reasons for mootness.”  Humphreys 
v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 105 F.3d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1996).  In 
this regard, courts consider whether the action became moot 
due to the appealing party’s own conduct or circumstances 
beyond the party’s control.  U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. 
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1994); see also 
Rendell, 484 F.3d at 242 (vacating the judgment because 
“mootness . . . occurred through happenstance—circumstances 
not attributable to the parties” (citation and quotation marks 
omitted)).  Indeed, even in circumstances where claims 
challenging legislation become moot due to the legislative 
body’s subsequent amendment, vacatur is appropriate if there 
is no evidence that the change was made with an intent to 
manipulate the judicial system.  See Khodara, 237 F.3d at 195.  
 
Here, the claims became moot for reasons outside the 
parties’ control and, even assuming they did not, there is no 
evidence that Defendants intended to manipulate the judicial 
system by allowing the orders to expire.  Instead, the 
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challenges to the Governor’s orders became moot as a result of 
the vote of Pennsylvania residents and a concurrent resolution 
of the General Assembly.  The claims against the Secretary 
became moot because the challenged orders expired by their 
own terms, which is not an action on this record that reflects 
an attempt to “manipulat[e] . . . the legal system, or . . . erase 
an unfavorable precedent through seeking vacatur.”  Lightner 
ex rel. NLRB v. 1621 Route 22 W. Operating Co., LLC, 729 
F.3d 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  As a result, following Munsingwear, we will vacate 
the judgment and remand to the District Court with instructions 
for it to dismiss the Complaint as moot.  See Planned 
Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261 (2021) 
(Mem.); Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262, 




For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal, 
vacate the judgment, and remand with instructions for the 
District Court to dismiss the Complaint as moot. 
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County of Butler, et al. v. Governor of Pennsylvania, et al.,  
No. 20-2936 
Jordan, J., concurring 
_________________________________________________ 
 
I join my colleagues’ opinion in full but write separately 
to note two things I think worth mentioning.  First, the question 
of mootness in this case is not, to my mind, a simple or easy 
one.  The Governor’s emergency powers have been reduced 
and the immediate sense of emergency has abated to a large 
degree, but both in reported public statements and in argument 
before us, “[t]he Wolf administration maintains that dissolving 
the disaster emergency does not affect a health secretary’s 
disease-prevention authority to issue mask-wearing and stay-
at-home orders or shut down schools and nonessential 
businesses.”  Marc Levy, Lawmakers Vote to End Emergency 
Declaration, Extend Waivers, Associated Press (June 10, 
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/pa-state-wire-
health-coronavirus-pandemic-government-and-politics-
f3980f25e76458063e1a4629f874c56a.  (See audio recording 
of oral argument held on July 22, 2021 at 2:53-3:55 
(https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/20-
2936CountyofButlerv.GovernorofPA.mp3).)  Whether that 
position is legally sound is not before us and I make no 
comment on it.  The point is that the Defendants-Appellants in 
this case – Governor Wolf and the Commonwealth’s Secretary 
of Health – have taken that position, so the possibility of future 
executive orders of the type challenged here is not 
fanciful.  But such orders would have to be just that – in the 
future – because it is undisputed that the challenged orders 
have all expired, and a legal remedy aimed at those particular 
orders is, by definition, impossible.  The case is thus moot, 
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unless one of the two well-known exceptions to mootness 
applies. 
 
 As described in the Court’s opinion today, one of those 
exceptions is found in the “voluntary cessation” doctrine.  If 
the person responsible for the challenged action stops it but can 
readily start it again, the dispute can rightly be said to still be 
live.  But, as also noted in the Court’s opinion, the Plaintiffs 
conceded at oral argument that the voluntary cessation doctrine 
does not apply in this case.  (Id. at 51:57-54:12.) 
 
That leaves the other exception to mootness, which 
reaches behavior that is capable of repetition yet evading 
review.  I agree with my colleagues that the Plaintiffs have 
failed to show that the orders at issue satisfy the requisites for 
application of that doctrine.  In particular, I doubt that “there is 
a reasonable expectation that the same complaining part[ies] 
will be subject to the same action again.”  United Steel Paper 
& Forestry Rubber Mfg. Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l 
Union v. Virgin Islands, 842 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
1969, 1976 (2016)).  The Plaintiffs insist that this case is not 
moot because the orders at issue are indeed capable of 
repetition yet evading review, but we have only their 
speculation that the same kind of heavily restrictive orders will 
be issued once more.  Given the recent, wide-spread reporting 
that the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus is causing 
increased concern among many public health authorities, the 
Plaintiffs’ position ought not be rejected out of hand, and it has 
not been.  Nevertheless, as noted in our opinion today, we have 
been given little reason to doubt the representations by the 
Governor and Secretary that the public health circumstances 
have changed so dramatically since the time the challenged 
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orders were entered that there is no reasonable expectation that 
they will be re-imposed.  So the case is over.     
 
Which leads to the second and final point I want to 
make.  The Plaintiffs have argued this case with an 
understandable vigor, believing, as they obviously do, that 
fundamental rights are at stake and were not properly respected 
by Pennsylvania’s governmental officials.  Without in anyway 
signaling a view on the merits – something I and the panel have 
assiduously avoided doing – I note simply that our ruling today 
should not be read as reflecting a lack of appreciation for the 
feelings generated by this case, nor as indicating a failure to 
understand that there are real-world consequences flowing 
from governmental responses to the unprecedented (at least in 
our lifetime) pandemic we are yet working our way through.  
The legal arguments of the Plaintiffs, of the elected and 
appointed officials on the other side of the “v.”, and of the 
amici aligned on either side have all been carefully considered, 
with full sympathy for the parties’ good faith and sincerity.  For 
all of that, though, a merits decision cannot be given because 
there is simply no longer a case or controversy to be decided.  
The boundaries of our jurisdiction are set, and the case-or-
controversy requirement embedded in Article III of the 
Constitution serves as a bulwark against judicial overreach.  
That is to everyone’s benefit, even if it can at times be 
frustrating to those who have worked for and want an answer 
from the courts.   
 
We are not through with COVID, and the unexpected 
may yet occur, but, under the rules governing our jurisdiction, 
considering the merits of this appeal or leaving the District 
Court’s decision extant would be a mistake.  I therefore concur 
in the opinion and judgment of the Court.  
